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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Global governance is expanding fast and in different directions, often 
without a clear or principled framework to guide institutional creation and 
change. Formal international institutions, intergovernmental networks, and 
private authorities operate side by side, sometimes in unison, sometimes in 
conflict, and all of them have close relations with a variety of domestic political 
actors. Yet the rise of authority on the global level has provoked increasing 
challenges, and calls for a more principled approach to allocating powers among 
different sites of governance have grown louder in recent years. 
One principle often put forward in this context is “subsidiarity.”1 
Subsidiarity is typically understood as a presumption for local-level 
decisionmaking, which allows for the centralization of powers only for 
particular, good reasons. The principle is widely seen as an attractive starting 
point for thinking about, and designing, the vertical distribution of powers in 
multilevel systems, as it reflects the idea that self-government is typically more 
meaningful on a smaller scale.2 Yet the indeterminacy of the principle, as well as 
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 1.  See, e.g., THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 
2008); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (1995); Andreas Føllesdal, The 
Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (2013); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A 
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004); Robert Howse & Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 
GOVERNANCE 73 (2003). 
 2.  See, e.g., FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY (Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann eds., 2014) 
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the negative consequences that might flow from leaving decisions at the 
national level, has also led to vocal critique. 
With this symposium, we analyze and evaluate the place and role of 
subsidiarity as a political and legal norm in global governance. We seek to 
understand in what contexts subsidiarity and related concepts have emerged 
and what variation they show across issue areas, institutional contexts, and 
involved actors. For this purpose, we inquire into different sites of 
decisionmaking (domestic, regional, transnational, and international) in the 
design of: new institutions; political and regulatory normmaking; and 
adjudication. Bringing together scholars from law, political science, and political 
philosophy, we seek to map the emerging landscape of subsidiarity, understand 
factors behind its shape, assess the status of subsidiarity as a legal or political 
norm, trace the effects of the use of subsidiarity, and evaluate its suitability as a 
guiding principle in the different contexts under analysis. 
In this framing article, we set the scene for this inquiry in five steps. We 
begin by outlining the rise of international authority and situating subsidiarity 
among alternative principles that might guide the allocation of powers between 
different levels of governance (part II). We then set out different possible 
versions of subsidiarity and clarify in which way we use the concept here (part 
III). Next, we draw on the literatures of comparative politics and law, as well as 
European Union (EU) studies, to assess experiences with subsidiarity in the 
context of other multilevel systems (part IV). We use these, as well as insights 
from the contributions to this symposium, to generate a number of hypotheses 
about the prevalence, potential, and limitations of subsidiarity in the context of 
global governance (part V). Finally, we assess to what extent, and in what 
circumstances, subsidiarity might be desirable as a guiding principle (part VI). 
We conclude in part VII by offering some final thoughts on what role 
subsidiarity should ultimately play in practice. 
The picture that emerges from this inquiry is not a homogeneous one. As 
reflected in this framing article and in the other contributions to this 
symposium, both analytically and normatively, there is significant variation 
across issue areas and institutional contexts. Yet even though subsidiarity may 
not provide all the answers to the challenge of allocating powers in global 
governance, it represents a useful starting point. Reflecting a general preference 
for local decisionmaking, subsidiarity is a suitable default rule for many areas of 
global governance and can, if properly specified and institutionalized, help to 
channel the activities of global institutions into areas in which they can be 
justified on a principled basis. 
 
 
(providing assessments of subsidiarity in (mostly) national contexts). 
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II 
THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The period since World War II has been characterized by the constant rise 
of international authority. Bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as 
international organizations have been growing in number and scope, and they 
have come to affect most fields of governance in one way or another. 
International authority has also become stronger and more independent of the 
preferences of individual states. States have delegated increasing authority to 
international institutions and international courts, many international bodies 
have evolved well beyond initial expectations, and new forms of transnational 
and private authority have emerged outside of formal delegation structures 
altogether.3 
For long, many scholars of international law and international relations 
viewed the rise of global authority in a positive light, as having increased the 
collective problem-solving capacity in an interdependent world.4 In recent 
years, however, several negative effects have been noticed more widely. These 
effects relate, in the first place, to a greater politicization of international 
authority,5 opening up new cleavages in domestic politics, with an increase in 
political groups characterized by pronounced skepticism of all things 
international. The greater attention to global governance has also led to 
stronger critiques based on its democratic deficit, weak accountability 
mechanisms, and lack of judicial control. Additionally, calls for checks along the 
lines of domestic models have grown over the years.6 Such critiques are 
especially pronounced among developing countries where, for years, many have 
perceived international institutions—especially the international financial 
institutions and the United Nations (UN) Security Council—as tools of 
domination for the Global North and have sought to create greater autonomous 
policy space.7 
These developments have provoked calls for a more principled approach to 
the definition and allocation of powers to institutions beyond the state. Such an 
approach should not be overly restrictive: international authority, despite its 
recent expansion, is still comparatively weak, especially in light of the 
magnitude of transboundary challenges. Yet this principled approach would 
need to balance a strong demand for international authority with concerns 
about politicization, democracy and the rule of law, and Western dominance. 
 
 3.  See, e.g., WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? (Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore & Susan K. 
Sell eds., 2010). 
 4.  See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987). 
 5.  See Michael Zürn, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and Its 
Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69 (2012). 
 6.  See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3,  2005, at 15. 
 7.  See Amitav Acharya, Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and 
Rule-Making in the Third World, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 95 (2011); Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International 
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
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A variety of normative principles have been proposed to guide the 
allocation of global authority. The classical criterion is the consent of 
contracting states: if states consensually decide to jointly exercise authority in a 
given issue area, their consent also establishes the appropriateness of the newly 
constituted international authority.8 This principle is easy to operationalize, but 
it does not offer any substantive guidance. Further, it fails to address situations 
in which consensual procedures are too slow and cumbersome to adapt the 
powers of international institutions to changing circumstances. As institutional 
action operates with increasing distance from initial delegation, or is not based 
on delegation at all, the usefulness of consent declines further.9 
Weighing utilitarian considerations—sometimes based on the criterion of 
“comparative benefit,”10 the idea of global public goods, or the Pareto 
principle—provides an alternative normative principle that suggests decisions 
should be allocated to the institution that can ensure the most effective 
provision of welfare.11 Utility or efficiency is difficult to assess, however: 
assessments tend to suffer from significant cognitive uncertainty, and utility, a 
social construction, tends to vary strongly among the participants of global 
governance institutions. 
Other approaches have a democratic origin. Some of these approaches 
suggest that the possibility of democratic self-governance exists only on the 
national level and thus favor national decisionmaking and control over 
international cooperation. Others emphasize democratic quality—the potential 
for participation, communication, and inclusiveness—and tend to be skeptical 
about global institutions for this reason.12 Cosmopolitan democrats, on the other 
hand, argue that the scope of decisions and those who are affected by them 
should be as congruent as possible.13 Moving decisions from domestic to 
international institutions is then regarded as warranted if policy problems 
extend beyond state borders, often resulting in calls for a substantial transfer of 
powers from the domestic to the international sphere.14 
 
 
 8.  For an emphasis on consent in the political philosophy debate, see Tom Christiano, The 
Legitimacy of International Institutions, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
380 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).  
 9.  See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
 10.  Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 422 (2006). 
 11.  See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 35–38 (1972) (discussing this theory in the 
federal context). 
 12.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 69 (2004); Robert A. Dahl, Can International 
Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano 
Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999). 
 13.  See, e.g., HELD, supra note 1; Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its 
Alternatives, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 40, 65–66 (2007). 
 14.  See Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other 
International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183 (2000). 
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A fourth set of substantive approaches builds on conceptions of justice. 
Defenders of cosmopolitan justice—with a strong emphasis of moral obligations 
beyond borders—often favor global authority: they justify the creation of strong 
supra-state institutions as instrumentally necessary in order to ensure 
compliance with transboundary obligations of justice, including obligations of 
distributive justice.15 The idea of national responsibility has the opposite effect. 
It does accept international authority in certain areas, most notably for the 
protection of basic rights. It is much more skeptical, however, of transboundary 
moral obligations and instead espouses the idea that national communities 
should normally govern their own fate autonomously.16 
Subsidiarity shares with the latter approach a general presumption for 
decisionmaking at the local level, but it can also be read as linked to other, 
more centralizing approaches. In the next part, we trace some of these linkages 
and clarify how the concept of “subsidiarity” as it is used throughout this issue. 
III 
THE CONCEPT OF SUBSIDIARITY 
Subsidiarity has long had a variety of meanings, and the resulting vagueness 
has only contributed to the appeal of the concept. As observers have noted, it is 
a “slippery, multifaceted, and polysemic concept,”17 and the apparent consensus 
on the importance of subsidiarity among a wide range of social and political 
actors “has been gained only by obfuscation.”18 Although the most prominent 
subsidiarity discourse today, that in the EU, mainly concerns the allocation of 
powers between national and European institutions, other variants have 
focused on the relation between state and society. 
Catholic social thought, often seen as central to the modern rise of 
subsidiarity as a political principle,19 employed subsidiarity to delineate spheres 
in which government can and should act, while at the same time protecting 
individuals and societal associations from what was regarded as excessive 
intervention. And whereas this latter variant drew its inspiration from principles 
of justice, others have drawn on ideas of liberty or economic efficiency in order 
to justify the primacy of lower-level decisionmaking.20 Subsidiarity has been 
conceptualized as part of very different approaches to allocating powers 
 
 15.  See, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 148–88 
(2005). On approaches to global distributive justice with other institutional consequences, see Michael 
Blake & Patrick Taylor Smith, International Distributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/international-justice/ (last visited Feb. 
26, 2016). 
 16.  DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 111–34 (2007). 
 17.  Pierpaolo Donati, What Does “Subsidiarity” Mean? The Relational Perspective, 12 J. MKTS. & 
MORALITY 211, 211 (2009). 
 18.  Andreas Føllesdal, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 190 (1998). 
 19.  David Golemboski, Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity, 45 PUBLIUS: J. 
FEDERALISM 526 (2015). 
 20.  See Føllesdal, supra note 18, at 200–07. 
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between spheres of authority, and the divergence in foundations has also led to 
significant divergence in interpretation. As a result, contestation reigns over not 
only the strength and beneficiaries of subsidiarity but also the kinds of demands 
subsidiarity makes on actors. 
A. A Rebuttable Presumption for the Local 
In order to retain conceptual clarity and make the concept of subsidiarity 
useful both for analytical purposes and for normative guidance, we need to 
specify in which sense we are using it here. The concept is unhelpful if it is 
generically seen to include any principled allocation of powers between levels of 
governance requiring “that powers should be allocated to the individual or 
institution that can best exercise them” or if it is interpreted as merely an 
unspecific preference for local action.21 These interpretations largely shift the 
allocation of authority over to other approaches that consider where such 
exercise might be “best” and thus deny subsidiarity an independent role. A 
meaningful concept of subsidiarity needs multiple criteria for allocating 
authority.22 
As a starting point, we understand subsidiarity as a rebuttable presumption 
for the local23—as a principle that requires decisionmaking to take place at a 
lower level unless good reasons exist for shifting it upward. Our focus is on 
vertical relations between governance institutions, that is, relations between 
institutions with a different scope of authority. Because we are primarily 
interested in the operation of subsidiarity in global governance, the most 
obvious application is to the relations between national and (regional as well as 
global) international institutions. Most contributions to this symposium adopt 
this focus. Yet in principle, subsidiarity can also extend to relations with sub-
state governments in federal states, local institutions (such as cities),24 and 
private forms of governance. For example, Peer Zumbansen’s article in this 
issue focuses specifically on the problems created by applying subsidiarity in the 
context of transnational private regulation.25 We exclude, however, relations of 
a merely horizontal or lateral nature, such as between different international 
 
 21.  Michelle Evans, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Social and Political Principle in Catholic 
Social Teaching, 3 SOLIDARITY: J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT & SECULAR ETHICS 44, 54 (2013); see also 
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Toward a Global Ethics of Trade Governance: Subsidiarity Writ 
Large, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 259 (arguing subsidiarity is mainly about deference 
to institutions with superior credentials).   
 22.  See Thomas M. Franck, The Centripede and the Centrifuge: Principles for the Centralisation and 
Decentralisation of Governance, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 19, 26–31 (Tomer Broude & 
Yuval Shany eds., 2008). 
 23.  Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-
Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 
147, 148. 
 24.  See Loren King, Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, 
supra note 2, at 291. 
 25.  See Peer Zumbansen, Happy Spells? Constructing and Deconstructing a Private-Law 
Perspective on Subsidiarity, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 215. 
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institutions, between states, or between institutions of private governance.26 The 
directionality of the subsidiarity relation in such instances is less clear, and the 
reasons for deference to one or the other institution (often taken to be 
geographical or functional proximity) differ from those typically adduced for 
vertical relationships. 
Although subsidiarity generally favors local action, it can also turn into a 
justification for higher-level decisionmaking.27 In this issue, Tomer Broude 
focuses on this risk in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO).28 In 
contrast with absolute principles of allocation, such as sovereignty, subsidiarity 
contains only a presumption that can be rebutted with good reasons. The lower 
the threshold for such “good reasons,” the more subsidiarity will facilitate 
centralization; the higher the threshold, the more it will push toward 
decentralization. 
What counts as a good reason is, unsurprisingly, disputed between the 
different versions of subsidiarity. Many approaches require greater 
effectiveness in problemsolving—they require desired results to be better 
achieved on the higher level, or action on the lower level to not be able to 
(sufficiently) achieve them. Low administrative, financial, legal, or political 
capacities of states may thus lead to calls for stronger involvement of 
international institutions.29 The EU conception of subsidiarity follows this line. 
Yet everything then hinges on the definition of the “desired results.”30 
Models of fiscal federalism, for example, accept only Pareto-improving central 
measures that address negative externalities, while the Catholic social tradition 
allows for measures that pursue goals of distributive justice and may leave 
certain units worse off. Some approaches leave the definition of goals to the 
sub-units, and others grant the central level a stronger role in this respect.31 As a 
result, the principle of subsidiarity, if insufficiently specified, can appear to do 
little actual work, being a mere placeholder for substantive conceptions of the 
proper distribution of powers between different levels of government. 
 
 
 26.  But see CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–26 (2008); Claus 
Kress, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international, 4 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 561, 579 (2006). 
 27.  See Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 
COMMON MKT L. REV. 63, 67–72 (2006). 
 28.  See Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiarity and Dialectic Deference in the World Trade 
Organization, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 53. 
 29.  See Isobel Roele, Sidelining Subsidiarity: United Nations Security Council “Legislation” and Its 
Infra-Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016. 
 30.  On this problem in the EU context, see Nicholas W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of 
Subsidiarity, 11 EUR. L. J. 308, 318 (2005); Davies, supra note 27, at 78. 
 31.  See Andreas Føllesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity, in FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at  214, 219–24. 
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B. Subsidiarity, Weak and Strong 
In order to avoid such a conflation, it is useful to think of two ideal types of 
subsidiarity with very dissimilar degrees of analytical independence. A weak 
version is characterized by an easily rebuttable presumption—a presumption for 
the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome by any reason that 
makes action on a higher level appear advantageous, be it for the sake of 
efficiency, efficacy, or justice. A strong version of subsidiarity, in contrast, is 
characterized by a high threshold—a presumption in favor of local governance 
that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases. Such reasons 
may lie in qualified negative externalities or justice considerations that may 
apply to certain circumscribed situations. It is only in such a strong version that 
subsidiarity remains relatively independent from other principles for the 
allocation of powers between different levels of governance. 
Subsidiarity is distinctive only when it acts as a trump—when it trumps 
certain good reasons for scaling governance up—and, as part V explains, the 
principle has a significant impact only when it is treated as such a trump. 
Practically, a strong version of subsidiarity might be grounded in the risk of 
abuse by higher-level institutions; normatively, it may find its basis in 
considerations of democracy or self-determination that may be seen to 
outweigh other reasons in normal circumstances. 
Thinking of subsidiarity in such strong terms may mean that it is not 
appropriate for all issue areas—as discussed in part VI, there may be areas in 
which a strong presumption in favor of the local is undesirable. Both empirically 
and normatively, subsidiarity may play varying roles across the fields of global 
governance: In some fields, it may come in a strong version; in others, it may 
come in a weak version; in yet others, it may not come at all. 
C. Bounded and Unbounded Contexts 
Operationalizing subsidiarity depends largely on the institutional context in 
which it operates. So far we have treated it as operating in an unbounded 
fashion—as a principle for attributing powers to certain levels of government in 
the abstract. Given the inevitable disagreement about the legitimate aims 
against which reasons for scaling decisionmaking up could be measured, 
however, the principle of subsidiarity will often be difficult to apply in such 
unbounded contexts. It may operate more as a broad constitutional principle 
with little scope for direct specification. 
We may find the subsidiarity principle to be more effective in bounded 
contexts: in situations in which the legitimate aims are institutionally 
predefined, and in which subsidiarity operates within an existing frame (rather 
than shoulders the construction of the frame itself). This is the typical context of 
subsidiarity in federal and quasi-federal systems, where it is meant to guide the 
exercise of certain, often-enumerated powers of the central level. The more 
clearly specified the potential aims of centralization, the easier it is to apply  
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subsidiarity, because the effects of decisionmaking at different levels can be 
compared with a view to those aims. 
Most contributions to this issue focus on cases of bounded subsidiarity. The 
definition of the frame in which subsidiarity operates here will typically follow 
principles other than subsidiarity. Procedurally, they may operate on a strict-
consent basis; substantively, they may be guided by substantive principles 
without any operation of a default rule. Subsidiarity’s scope is then limited to 
filling the gaps in that frame. 
The most heavily bounded context in which subsidiarity operates is that of 
interpretation in judicial or quasi-judicial fora. Rather than weighing reasons for 
one or the other site of decisionmaking, it is usually understood as implying 
deference to the local level when the relevant norms leave room for competing 
interpretations. The most prominent example in an international context is 
probably the margin-of-appreciation doctrine used by the European Court of 
Human Rights, yet we encounter similar techniques in other settings.32 
Interpreting an open text is usually not a technical enterprise, but one that 
requires recourse to substantive arguments about “right” answers. Subsidiarity 
thus may be seen to provide a presumption that fills the interpretative space, 
but one that retains its rebuttable character as other reasons may, exceptionally, 
militate against deference. Here, too, subsidiarity is limited to filling a frame—
an open-textured legal norm—constructed on the basis of other principles. 
D. Allocation, Exercise, Interaction 
Subsidiarity is typically understood primarily as a principle for allocating 
powers to different levels of governance, yet it may also provide guidance on 
how powers are to be exercised. For example, subsidiarity can be thought to 
include an element of proportionality that requires powers to be exercised in a 
way that is not more intrusive for lower levels than alternative ways to achieve 
the same aim.33 Subsidiarity may also find expression in procedural mechanisms, 
such as the involvement of national parliaments in the application of 
subsidiarity in the EU legislative process, or certain forms of veto rights for 
lower levels as against potential encroachments.34 Robert Howse and Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis, in their contribution to this issue,35 highlight a significant number of 
potential promoters of subsidiarity in the context of world trade law. If the 
 
 32.  See, e.g., DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014); Yuval Shany, 
Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 
(2005); see also Broude, supra note 28; Føllesdal, supra note 23 at 147; Howse & Nicolaïdis supra note 
21; René Urueña, Subsidiarity and the Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 99. 
 33.  Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity, in 9 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 653, 653 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007). 
 34.  See supra Part III.B;  see also Xavier Groussot & Sanja Bogojević, Subsidiarity as a Procedural 
Safeguard of Federalism, in THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 234 (Loïc 
Azoulay ed., 2014) (providing discussion related to the EU). 
 35.  See generally Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra at note 21. 
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concept is to retain a distinctive shape, however, it should not include in its 
purview all organizational and procedural devices that might favor the local 
level, or that might facilitate interaction and dialogue between levels of 
governance. As a default rule for the distribution of decision-making powers, 
subsidiarity is primarily an allocative principle. 
IV 
EXPERIENCES WITH SUBSIDIARITY: FEDERAL STATES AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Although the discussion on subsidiarity in global governance is only 
beginning, it is tempting to look at the experiences of federal states and the EU. 
These systems have a longer history of conflicts over the allocation, exercise, 
and adjudication of powers and should therefore be sources of inspiration for 
the application of subsidiarity in global governance. In federal states, however, 
subsidiarity, understood as an explicit constitutional principle that can be 
enforced by courts, plays a surprisingly marginal role. The Australian, Brazilian, 
Canadian, and U.S. constitutions do not contain explicit references to 
subsidiarity. The German constitution mentions subsidiarity only with respect 
to German participation in the EU, but not explicitly as an organizing principle 
for domestic federalism.36 However, it does contain a functionally equivalent 
provision, which links the adoption of federal legislation in areas of concurrent 
powers to criteria such as “the establishment of equivalent living conditions” or 
“the maintenance of legal or economic unity.”37 Only the Swiss federal 
constitution, as revised in 1999 and later, mentions subsidiarity both as a broad 
general principle and in a specific article on the powers of the federal level.38 On 
the whole, therefore, subsidiarity seems to play only a small role in constitutions 
of federal states.39 
There are several potential reasons for this relatively low number of explicit 
appearances of subsidiarity in federal constitutions. Many suggest that 
subsidiarity is not a specific principle achieving a clearly defined goal that could 
be contrasted with other such principles. Instead, it is a way of expressing the 
fundamental problématique of federalism itself: how to balance unity and 
diversity, with a preference for diversity rather than unity, in order to make 
federations more democratic, more effective, and more adaptive. In that sense, 
subsidiarity is “the soul of federalism.”40 In this view, however, subsidiarity is 
 
 36.  GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] May 23, 1949, art. 23, ¶ 1, (Ger.), translation at http://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.   
 37.  Id. art. 72, ¶ 2. 
 38.  BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 5a, 43a ¶ 1 (Switz.). 
 39.  See also Jürgen Bröhmer, Subsidiarity and the German Constitution, in GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 129; Michelle Evans, Subsidiarity and Federalism: A 
Case Study of the Australian Constitution and Its Interpretation, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 185; Augusto Zimmermann, Subsidiarity, Democracy and Individual 
Liberty in Brazil, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 85. 
 40.  See Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal 
1-KRISCH AND JACHTENFUCHS INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:45 PM 
No. 2 2016] SUBSIDIARITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 11 
merely an expression of a preference for the local that leaves open how this is to 
be achieved. In federal constitutions, other means seem to be more promising, 
most notably the enumeration of powers for each level of government. 
In the EU, subsidiarity has occupied an increasingly prominent place. 
Introduced as a formal principle for the first time in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty,41 it has since been constantly refined and extended with a view to 
strengthening it. The EU is a highly interesting case for assessing the potential 
of subsidiarity in global governance. Its legislative powers have continuously 
increased in both scope and depth during the last six decades, even during the 
“Eurocrisis.”42 At the same time, the EU has probably made a larger effort than 
any other polity to put subsidiarity into practice.43 
The discovery of subsidiarity in the EU during the 1990s and the increased 
attention given to it at least in some federal states might have been caused by 
uneasiness with the steady growth of powers of the center. Germany has 
embarked on a broader reform of its federal system in order to strengthen the 
Länder.44 In Switzerland, the constitutional reforms of 1999 and subsequent 
years were aimed at strengthening federal diversity, and it is in this context that 
subsidiarity received greater attention. However, this broad movement also 
shows the problems and limits of subsidiarity. 
One possible function of subsidiarity is to guide the legislator. This is most 
clearly the case in Switzerland and Germany.45 It is also Bermann’s 
interpretation of U.S. constitutional traditions.46 The underlying rationale is that 
subsidiarity essentially deals with political questions of power-sharing, which 
should be left to the political process and should normally not be used by 
constitutional courts to review legislative activity. The pervasive centralizing 
tendencies in many federations as well as in the EU, however, indicate that 
legislators at the higher level are not easy to tame. The logic here is the same as 
in domestic or international “constitutional moments”: If decisionmakers have 
the required majorities and the desire to strengthen central institutions, a  
 
 
Systems, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 231. This is also the main thrust of the 
argument in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001). 
 41.  Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247. 
 42.  Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, Conflict-Minimising Integration: How the EU 
Achieves Massive Integration Despite Massive Protest, in THE END OF THE EUROCRATS’ DREAM: 
ADJUSTING TO EUROPEAN DIVERSITY 166 (Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs & Christian 
Joerges eds., 2016).  
 43.  For overviews, see Gabriel A. Moens & John Trone, Subsidiarity as Judicial and Legislative 
Review Principles in the European Union, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, 
at 157; ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE (2002). 
 44.  See generally FRITZ W. SCHARPF, FÖDERALISMUSREFORM: KEIN AUSWEG AUS DER 
POLITIKVERFLECHTUNGSFALLE? (2009). 
 45.  Bröhmer, supra note 39, at 132. 
 46.  See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 403 (1994). 
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decentralizing principle such as subsidiarity needs independent safeguards in 
order to be effective. 
Courts are classical safeguards. By the very nature of their function, 
however, courts enter the process very late. On the whole, they seem to be 
rather reluctant to use the subsidiarity principle for striking down federal 
legislation. The Supreme Court of Canada has on a few occasions referred to 
the principle of subsidiarity, but its jurisprudence is often regarded as 
strengthening the central government rather than the provinces, most notably 
because it accords the criterion of efficiency a prominent place in 
operationalizing subsidiarity.47 Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
become more active in adjudicating such issues.48 Still, the debate is about the 
extent of limited Supreme Court involvement, not about a strong subsidiarity 
watchdog. Even in the EU, which, contrary to the United States, has a legally 
enforceable subsidiarity principle, scrutiny by the European Court of Justice 
has not led to many practical results. According to Paul Craig, slightly over ten 
cases in nearly twenty years presented a “real subsidiarity challenge.”49 Overall, 
the assessment is rather skeptical.50 
Supreme courts in federations and in the EU are central-level institutions 
and may have an inbuilt centralizing bias. For this reason, “safeguard 
subsidiarity”51—decentralized safeguards—often appears to be an attractive 
option. The EU has tried to implement this idea by empowering national 
parliaments. The most significant recent innovations are the “yellow card” and 
“orange card” procedures, by which a third (and at a second stage, half) of 
member-state parliaments can temporarily block a legislative proposal and 
force the Commission to review it on the basis of concerns about subsidiarity.52 
The most important result so far is the withdrawal of a Commission 
proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective 
action after objections by twelve national parliaments.53 But one should be 
cautious in expecting too much from this safeguard: In parliamentary systems, 
which are the overwhelming majority in the EU, cases in which the 
parliamentary majority will not support “its” government are likely to be rare 
 
 47.  See Jean Leclair, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at 
the Expense of Diversity, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 411 (2003); see also Eugénie Brouillet, Canadian Federalism 
and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora’s Box?, 54 SUP. CT. L. REV. 601 (2011). 
 48.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from 
U.S. Constitutional Law, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 123. 
 49.  Paul P. Craig, Subsidiarity, a Political and Legal Analysis, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 72, 80 (2012). 
 50.  Id. at 84. 
 51.  Bednar, supra note 40, at 241–50. 
 52.  For a comprehensive evaluation of the experiences with these procedures see PHILIPP KIIVER, 
THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY (2012). 
 53.  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action 
within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services, COM 
(2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 2012). 
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and limited to extreme cases.54 Still, because these procedures are relatively new 
and entail a partial substantive change from established practices, participants 
find their way into them slowly. On the whole, it seems the EU’s involvement of 
national parliaments is moderately successful, and more successful than 
entrusting the European Court of Justice with subsidiarity control.55 
The wording of the subsidiarity principle in the EU is also problematic. The 
Treaty on European Union, in its current version, provides: “the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.”56 It implies that there is agreement 
about the goals or objectives of a planned action and, by making effectiveness 
the main criterion for the allocation of tasks to a specific level, reflects a weak 
version of the subsidiarity principle.57 But in a heterogeneous social and 
institutional setting, goals will often be neither clear nor consensual. If central 
European institutions have the last word in defining these goals, their 
institutional self-interests in increasing powers and resources may well prevail. 
Moreover, if effectiveness of (potential) problemsolving is chosen as the 
primary criterion, this will likely have a centralizing effect because many policy 
externalities and collective goals can indeed be better dealt with at the higher 
level—especially the EU’s prime goal, the completion of the internal market.58 
The Swiss constitution adopts much stronger wording according to which “[t]he 
Federation only undertakes tasks that the Cantons are unable to perform or 
which require uniform regulation by the Federation.”59 Still, it is uncertain 
whether this really limits federal encroachment upon cantonal powers.60 
From this short discussion of federal states and the EU, we learn several 
things. First, subsidiarity is only one among several devices for assuring a 
preference for lower-level decisionmaking. Its practical scope in federal states 
as well as in the EU—which has spent enormous energy in implementing it—is 
limited, and it needs to be coupled with other safeguards in order to be 
effective. Second, courts are of limited use in “enforcing” the subsidiarity 
principle upon legislators because the courts tend to consider subsidiarity to be 
a political question outside of their scope for adjudication and because the 
criteria for the application of subsidiarity are often vaguely defined. Third, 
lower-level parliaments may be rather effective in limiting higher-level 
legislative activity but are also bound by their interest to support their own  
 
 
 54.  SERGIO FABBRINI, WHICH EUROPEAN UNION? EUROPE AFTER THE EURO CRISIS 145 
(2015). 
 55.  KIIVER, supra note 52, at 148. 
 56.  Treaty on European Union, supra note 41. 
 57.  On the distinction between weak and strong versions, see Part III.B supra. 
 58.  A point made forcefully by Davies, supra note 27. 
 59.  BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 43a, ¶ 1 (Switz.). 
 60.  Regula Kägi-Diener, Current Challenges Faced by Swiss Federalism, in 1 THE WAYS OF 
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN 
333, 341 (Alberto López-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013). 
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government. Finally, notions of subsidiarity that assume agreement on the 
problem to be solved are inherently problematic in heterogeneous systems. 
V 
TRAJECTORIES OF SUBSIDIARITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Subsidiarity is leaving traces in many fields of global governance, but as the 
contributions to this issue show, these traces have very different strengths in 
different contexts. It is thus important to get a clearer picture of where and 
under what conditions subsidiarity is likely to emerge and evolve. This part 
develops some theoretically grounded conjectures about the trajectories of 
subsidiarity in global governance, on the basis of a few simple assumptions 
about the demand for subsidiarity (that is, constellations in which subsidiarity 
would be useful and may be requested by some actors), its supply (that is, the 
conditions under which subsidiarity is actually provided), and the conditions for 
its effectiveness. These conjectures reflect observations advanced in the 
different contributions to this symposium, but they provide starting points for 
further work, rather than firm conclusions. 
A. The Demand for Subsidiarity in Multilevel Systems 
On the most general level, the emergence of subsidiarity in global 
governance typically responds to a need of finding organizing principles that go 
“beyond consent” in a world in which policymaking increasingly rests with 
regional and international bodies. The formal powers of these bodies, often 
vaguely defined, tend to provide only limited institutional guidance and will 
often be further diluted as a regime evolves over time. National governments 
and other domestic actors are likely to demand new safeguards as they evolve. 
According to René Urueña, the extent to which new safeguards are developed 
depends more on how actors interpret the rise of international public authority 
than on international bodies’ “real” authority.61 
Based on these thoughts, our first conjecture is that the more global 
governance is considered by states and domestic actors to be a vertical multilevel 
system, with significant authority located at the global level, the more likely 
subsidiarity is to be in demand as a tool for containing the expansion of this 
authority. Challenges of the UN Security Council’s expanding authority, as 
discussed in the contributions by Isobel Roele62 and Machiko Kanetake,63 
exemplify this just as much as the extensive, and still recent, contestation over 
the international investment regime which, as shown by René Urueña,64 is 
fueled by the increasing recognition of the “public authority” of investment 
tribunals (and the need to develop a “public law” response). 
 
 61.  Urueña, supra note 32, at 100–01. 
 62.  See Roele, supra note 29, at 189. 
 63.  See Machiko Kanetake, Subsidiarity in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 165. 
 64.  Urueña, supra note 32, at 116. 
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In such multilevel systems, the interest of governments in limiting higher-
level decisionmaking through principles such as subsidiarity is likely to depend 
on the degree of political control they can exercise over outcomes. If member-
state unanimity is required, or if states enjoy ample veto power, subsidiarity is 
not needed, at least from the perspective of national executives. This changes as 
decisionmaking moves away from member states or becomes subject to 
(qualified) majority rule. The demand for subsidiarity is thus likely to arise 
when states pool their powers and exercise them jointly, as occurs, for example, 
in political bodies such as the UN Security Council or the International 
Monetary Fund Executive Board. 
The demand for subsidiarity will be even greater when states delegate 
authority to independent bodies with substantial discretion to decide.65 
Similarly, one can expect a stronger demand when institutions that do not 
operate on the basis of delegation make consequential decisions, as is the case 
for private authorities. A second conjecture is thus that demand for subsidiarity 
grows with the distance from state consent, and that it is higher in cases of 
delegated authority than in cases of pooled authority. For example, Andreas von 
Staden’s discussion of regional trade integration in various settings suggests 
that, in the absence of properly supranational elements, calls for 
decentralization or subsidiarity tend to remain weak.66 
Whether a demand is triggered will also depend on the way in which global 
authority is exercised. Domestic actors, such as parliaments, political parties, 
business associations, or civil society groups, pay attention to action by 
international or transnational institutions mainly when they see that their 
interests or values are directly at stake.67 This will often be the case when global 
institutions not only make rules but also apply them to particular cases, as is 
typically the case for judicial bodies. In contrast to earlier periods, when 
international norms provided space for specification by national political and 
legal systems, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals and their 
often expansionary, evolutionary interpretation of international rules have 
reduced this space, provoking counterclaims for self-restraint and deference in 
order to safeguard national autonomy. A third conjecture is thus that demand 
for subsidiarity grows when acts of global governance institutions are highly 
intrusive and concern specific cases. The European Court of Human Rights and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the focus of the contributions by Andreas 
Føllesdal68 and Tomer Broude,69 are prime examples. 
 
 65.  For a conceptual as well as empirical discussion of pooling and delegation, see Liesbet Hooghe 
& Gary Marks, Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations, 10 REV. INT’L ORGS. 305 
(2015). 
 66.  Andreas von Staden, Subsidiarity in Regional Integration Regimes in Latin America and Africa, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 27, 44 (discussing subsidiarity and the Economic 
Community of West African States). 
 67.  Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Ehrhardt, supra note 5. 
 68.  See Føllesdal, supra note 23. 
 69.  See Broude, supra note 28. 
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B. The Limited Supply of Subsidiarity 
Yet even where there is demand for subsidiarity, its supply—the actual 
establishment of a subsidiarity norm in an institutional setting—may be limited. 
This is due, in part, to the interest structure behind a given regime. When global 
decisionmaking is giving effect to reciprocal bargains, or seeking to deal with 
negative externalities of domestic decisionmaking, states interested in the 
positive effects of the regime will likely resist subsidiarity. This may be the case, 
for example, in trade and investment, where states that see themselves as 
overall beneficiaries reject what they see as a loosening of the standards for 
others through greater deference to domestic policies. Isabel Feichtner’s 
account of the challenges of introducing subsidiarity concerns into the 
decisionmaking of political bodies in the WTO70 draws attention to such 
constraints. 
The situation is different when regimes do not deal with significant 
externalities, as is the case, for example, for human rights regimes or 
international criminal justice. In these contexts, states bind themselves rather 
than others,71 have a less direct interest in compliance by others, and are less 
likely to resist subsidiarity as a guiding principle. We thus formulate a fourth 
conjecture: The supply of subsidiarity will be higher in regimes dealing with 
issues without international repercussions than for institutions regulating actual 
or potential negative externalities. 
The effect of this limitation is greatest when the benefits of a regime accrue 
asymmetrically to powerful countries. Powerful states may strongly resist the 
application of the subsidiarity principle in the operation of an institution 
because they have a vested interest in the constraints it places on other 
countries’ freedom of action. This is apparent, for example, in the international 
investment protection regime: as long as this regime was perceived to burden 
primarily developing countries, there was great resistance to subsidiarity by the 
main beneficiaries—the powerful economies of the Global North. As the latter, 
too, are increasingly subject to investment disputes, openness to subsidiarity has 
increased and, as René Urueña demonstrates, struggles over the degree of 
deference due to local institutions have intensified.72 The fifth conjecture 
suggests that subsidiarity tends to not be supplied if a powerful actor is strongly 
interested in the constraints on other countries imposed by a uniform 
interpretation of the regime’s rules. 
 
 70.  See Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity in the World Trade Organization: The Promise of Waivers, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 75, 82–84. 
 71.  On this distinction, see Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. 
Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2008, at 37. On the self-binding 
character of the European human rights regime, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights 
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000). 
 72.  See, e.g., Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 545, 555–58 (2014); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a 
Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 296 
(2010); Urueña, supra note 32. 
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When authority is delegated to, or exercised by, bodies with a certain level 
of autonomy, the control by states may be limited or indirect.73 This may be 
especially so for institutions acting as trustees, rather than as agents of states, as 
is often the case for independent courts or dispute settlement bodies.74 The 
supply of subsidiarity by such institutions will thus follow a different logic and is 
likely to depend on the degree to which they are vulnerable to, and need to 
accommodate, challenges by national governments and domestic actors. The 
European human rights regime, for example, developed its “margin of 
appreciation” doctrine in the early days when it was weak—well before it found 
broad recognition and intensified its scrutiny of member states’ policies.75 
Along these lines, we may formulate a sixth conjecture according to which 
central institutions with significant and stable institutional and political autonomy 
are likely to be reluctant suppliers of subsidiarity. Andreas Føllesdal notes that 
this conjecture may not sit well with the continuing use of the margin 
appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights up until the present—
though this use may be due, precisely, to the renewed challenges the Court 
faces over its expansionary jurisprudence.76 On the other hand, Jorge Contesse’s 
contribution on the inter-American human rights regime describes institutions 
that, despite their weak authority, refused from the start to accept a subsidiarity 
principle to maintain the moral high ground over authoritarian governments.77 
Both accounts urge unpacking the sources of authority on which independent 
institutions rest in detail. 
Although generalizations are difficult, it is clear that subsidiarity’s demand 
is typically higher than its supply. Subsidiarity is not in demand everywhere. In 
environmental policy, for instance, most institutions are weak and do not trigger 
significant challenges. Yet for many other areas in which global authority has 
grown in strength and scope over the last decades, a demand for subsidiarity 
will likely be observable, even though its supply may not be forthcoming 
because of the resistance by strong states or veto players. 
 
 
 73.  See Hooghe & Marks, supra note 65, at 307. On the informal influence of powerful countries, 
see, for example, RANDALL W. STONE, CONTROLLING INSTITUTIONS:  INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power 
in International Organization: the Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209 
(2009). 
 74.  See Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR. 
J. INT’L REL. 33, 35 (2008). 
 75.  On the evolution of the Court, see Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of 
the Strasbourg Court: From Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 43 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask 
Madsen eds., 2011). 
 76.  Føllesdal, supra note 23 at 162–63. 
 77.  Jorge Contesse, Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016. 
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C. Effectiveness 
Even if subsidiarity is accepted in a given institutional setting, it will not 
necessarily have a significant effect on the allocation of powers, especially as a 
tool of decentralization. As we have already seen in the EU context, 
subsidiarity often appears to observers as a fig leaf, unable to halt centralization 
processes, yet providing them with a veneer of acceptability. 
Whether or not the principle has teeth will depend, in part, on its 
formulation. As mentioned above, if used in a weak sense—with a low 
threshold for countervailing, centralizing reasons—subsidiarity is likely to 
remain relatively inconsequential, simply because it provides too much leeway 
for actors to employ their own criteria in determining where an issue may be 
handled most “effectively.” As Tomer Broude notes in his contribution, the 
flexible principles governing deference in the WTO dispute settlement context 
represent not so much a rule or principle as a “discursive device of negotiation 
over power and authority among a multiplicity of actors, pulling and pushing in 
different directions.”78 This impression is yet stronger in those contexts that, like 
the African regional integration regimes analyzed by Andreas von Staden,79 
employ explicitly open and vague formulations of subsidiarity. One may thus 
assume, as a seventh conjecture, that weak formulations of subsidiarity are 
unlikely to have a significant decentralizing effect. 
The effects of subsidiarity will largely depend, therefore, on the institutions 
that interpret the principle and give it meaning. The experience in federal 
systems, and in the EU, points to a very limited role of central institutions, 
especially central courts, as guardians of subsidiarity—central bodies tend to 
protect the authority of the central level.80 As a result, the EU has empowered 
national parliaments to exercise this role, with a potentially greater effect. In the 
global context, similarly complex procedures are unlikely to be established, but 
domestic bodies such as courts or parliaments may perform similar functions 
when they hold the keys to compliance with decisions by international bodies. 
Thus, national and regional courts have pushed central decision-making 
bodies—the UN Security Council, the WTO dispute settlement system, or the 
European Court of Human Rights—to move closer to their views.81 Machiko 
Kanetake, in her contribution to this symposium, focuses precisely on this 
mechanism with a view to the UN sanctions regime.82 We thus formulate an 
eighth conjecture that subsidiarity is likely to have stronger decentralizing effects 
if lower-level actors play a significant role in its interpretation and policing. 
 
 78.  Broude, supra note 28, at 73.  
 79.  See von Staden, supra note 66, at 39–50. 
 80.  See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary, in THE 
OXFORD HANDOOK OF LAW & POLITICS 142, 160 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & 
Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008). 
 81.  See NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF 
POSTNATIONAL LAW  (2010). 
 82.  Kanetake, supra note 63. 
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Not all settings are equally suited to the application of principles on the 
allocation of powers. In multilevel systems, in which different levels of 
government enjoy formal decision-making powers, such principles find 
relatively easy application. The situation is more difficult in less clearly defined 
institutional contexts, in which responsibilities may be shared rather than 
distributed and in which policymaking does not occur through identifiable 
decisions but instead occurs in multi-actor processes without clear cut-off 
points. Many areas of global governance are of this latter character—they are 
“governance without government,”83 operating through soft tools and through 
the interaction of multiple, only loosely coupled spheres of authority of a 
domestic as well as transnational and international kind.84 
The decision-making structures are not fixed in this case but dynamically 
adapt to the social and political environment, often resulting in forms of 
authority that may better be described as “liquid” than “solid.”85 In such 
contexts, subsidiarity can hardly be anchored in an institutional framework or 
targeted at particular decisions or actors. Informal tools often appear less 
intrusive than formally binding decisions, but as Isobel Roele’s contribution 
shows, they may also serve to subvert the constraints imposed by formal 
structures.86 In her account, the UN Security Council’s turn to cooperative 
implementation and best practices (rather than coercive tools) created 
“disciplines” for member states that escaped the principled approach of 
subsidiarity.87 Similar challenges exist in many other areas of global governance, 
from financial regulation to environmental affairs; applying subsidiarity to the 
formal side of the governance structure might simply miss the target. Building 
on this argument, our ninth conjecture states that subsidiarity is likely to be 
more effective as a principle for formal, concentrated decisionmaking, rather than 
as guidance for the more liquid contexts of global governance. 
D. Subsidiarity in Law 
Even when it is supplied, however, subsidiarity tends to have a different 
complexion in global governance than in other multilevel systems. In federal 
states (insofar as subsidiarity exists) and in the EU, subsidiarity can provide an 
overarching legal principle, a common norm with legal effects on all levels. In 
the global sphere, however, this is rendered difficult by the very structure of the 
 
 83.  See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD 
POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
 84.  See also Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 
PERSP. ON POL. 13, 15–21 (2009).  
 85.  Nico Krisch, Authority, Solid and Liquid, in the Postnational Sphere, in AUTHORITY IN 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (R. Cotterrell & M. del Mar, eds.) (forthcoming August 
2016)(using “liquidity” to refer to forms of authority that are informal, rely on substantive groundings, 
and are characterized by multiplicity and dynamism). 
 86.  See Roele, supra note 29, at 204–14 (conducting a case study of the Financial Action Task 
Force and concluding that the resulting disciplinary infra-law hinders national control in some 
respects). 
 87.  Id. 
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international legal order. Usually conceived of as separate from domestic law, 
international law cannot directly impose binding rules on domestic actors, nor 
can domestic law formally impose rules on international institutions. As a 
result, an international rule for the allocation of powers may sit alongside a 
competing rule in the domestic legal order, leading to institutional contestation 
over the general principle guiding the allocation. 
This problem is exacerbated because the number of legal orders, and the 
overlaps between them, are growing even on the international plane, thus 
sustaining a trend toward fragmentation and a properly “pluralist” postnational 
legal order.88 Subsidiarity may find increasing acceptance as a legal principle, 
especially in the form of a national margin of appreciation,89 but it remains 
confined to certain issue areas and institutions. 
As the contributions to this symposium show, subsidiarity is strong in the 
European but not in the inter-American human rights system; it is established, 
to some extent, in international trade while still highly contested in 
international investment law; it is a pillar of European integration but hardly 
present in other regional integration regimes; and it is present in merely limited 
traces in the context of international security. The trajectories of these issue 
areas vary widely, and it is unlikely that subsidiarity will consolidate into a 
general principle of international law any time soon.90 Subsidiarity, as any norm 
governing relations between sites of governance, will then have only partial 
application—it may regulate the relations of one of those sites to its 
environment, but it is unable to make a claim to regulating these relations 
comprehensively for all sites involved—unless one takes a strong normative 
approach to the interpretation of global law.91 
In this fragmented order, some consolidation may result from an 
establishment of subsidiarity norms in all these different sites, drawing on 
“multi-sourced equivalent norms”92 and potentially leading to converging 
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 92.  See MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tomer Broude & 
Yuval Shany eds., 2011). 
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interpretations over time.93 Such a convergence will, however, remain 
contingent and dependent on a cooperative stance of the political and judicial 
bodies that take part in the interpretative process. Institutionally, convergence 
is difficult to ensure without a substantial transformation toward a vertically 
and horizontally integrated, federal-style multilevel system. 
VI 
THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR SUBSIDIARITY 
Subsidiarity has traditionally been defended on a variety of normative 
grounds. Individual liberty, efficiency, justice, democracy, self-determination, 
political accountability, and respect for social and cultural diversity have been 
put forward by different traditions of thought.94 These grounds reflect divergent 
visions of the proper allocation of authority—discussed in part II—and they 
have widely varying implications for the strength and scope of subsidiarity in 
global governance. 
A. Normative Grounds 
Economic efficiency is often put forward as a ground for subsidiarity, based 
on the assumption that proximity to the issue, availability of local information, 
lower experimentation costs, and a greater potential for innovation create a 
preference for lower-level decisionmaking.95 Such grounding yields only a weak 
version of subsidiarity, because the preference for the local can easily be 
overcome when a higher level is more effective at problem solving, or can solve 
problems at a lower cost. For transboundary problems, this will often be the 
case, because the production of externalities, coordination problems, and 
economies of scale tend to render decentralized action costly. As has been 
observed even for the relatively weak subsidiarity principle in the EU, a 
preference for local decisions can have significant negative effects on regulatory 
efficacy.96 Unlike in some domestic contexts, efficiency is hardly appropriate as 
a key criterion in the global realm where diverse societies and political systems 
pursue different aims—differences that deserve respect but that a focus on 
comparative efficiency suppresses. 
In contrast, culturalist or nationalist claims, or those based on respect for 
value pluralism or an idea of self-determination of groups and peoples, tend to 
ground a strong version of subsidiarity, in which higher-level decisionmaking is 
admissible only in narrow circumstances. This reflects a more pluralist than 
solidarist vision of international society, with an emphasis on citizens’ interest in 
realizing their values, ideas, or ways of life free from outside intervention—
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 94.  Bermann, supra note 46; Føllesdal, supra note 18. 
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Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231 (2011); Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 48, at 128–37. 
 96.  Craig, supra note 49, at 85. 
1-KRISCH AND JACHTENFUCHS INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:45 PM 
22 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:1 
somewhat analogous to multiculturalist theories for diverse domestic societies.97 
Howse and Nicolaïdis take a similar path with a view to international trade 
law,98 but the thrust of the idea is not limited to this field.99 
Similar results often stem from democracy arguments that emphasize the 
greater strength of democratic processes on a smaller scale, given the potential 
for communication and deliberation and the proximity of decisionmakers and 
participants in the process.100 The result is a strong preference for the local in 
these areas, at least insofar as local decisionmaking can make a good claim to 
accordance with democratic principles. Along these lines, Contesse calls for a 
turn toward subsidiarity in the inter-American human rights system in response 
to the improved democratic pedigree of its member states.101 This strong 
presumption for the local is mitigated, however, for cosmopolitan democrats 
whose decisions should, along the lines of the congruence principle, be taken at 
a level that includes all individuals that are significantly affected by such 
decisions.102 In this framework, the case for subsidiarity with respect to 
transboundary problems may be considerably weaker.103 
Here, too, the strength of the case for subsidiarity will depend on the quality 
of decisionmaking at the different levels. For cosmopolitan democrats, the 
democratic quality of international institutions will calibrate their weight in the 
overall structure. Also, from other perspectives, institutions with a less inclusive 
or representative pedigree, even if endowed with formal powers through 
delegation, will be expected to practice greater deference to the domestic level 
than those fulfilling higher institutional standards.104 For most international 
institutions in existence, with all their deficits regarding responsiveness to the 
diverse world public, this consideration suggests a strong version of subsidiarity. 
B. Countervailing Reasons 
On the basis of these considerations, there is a plausible initial case for 
strong subsidiarity in global governance. Reasons that stem from culturalism 
 
 97.  See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 209 (1980); BRAD ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT (2011). On 
multicultural theory, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS (1996). On pluralism and solidarism, see ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL 
ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2007). 
98.    See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 21, at 262 (exploring a “global trade ethics”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Epistemic Subsidiarity—Coexistence, Cosmopolitanism, 
Constitutionalism, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 133 (2013) (adopting a pluralist vision of international society in 
the context of risk governance). 
 100.  See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 12; Kumm, supra note 91; von Staden, supra note 66. 
 101.  See Contesse, supra note 77. 
 102.  See supra text accompanying notes 12–14. 
 103.  See also Kumm, supra note 91; Raffaele Marchetti, Models of Global Democracy in Defence of 
Cosmo-federalism, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 22, 39–42 
(Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 2011); Andreas L. Paulus, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Democracy: 
Towards the Demise of General International Law?, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 195–96 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008). 
 104.  For an argument of this kind, see Krisch, supra note 81, at 70–105. 
1-KRISCH AND JACHTENFUCHS INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:45 PM 
No. 2 2016] SUBSIDIARITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23 
and value pluralism typically converge with arguments stemming from 
democracy, especially accounting for the limited institutional legitimacy of most 
global institutions. Strong subsidiarity does not imply, however, that decisions 
should not be taken at the global level at all. Yet allocating powers to the global 
level, or filling the space opened up by prior delegation, requires strong reasons. 
A simple reference to greater economic efficiency, effectiveness in 
problemsolving, or the transboundary character of a problem—as in weak 
versions of subsidiarity—does not suffice. 
One reason for upscaling is consent, which leaves defining the frame of 
cooperation in the hands of the sub-units and may lead to an application of 
subsidiarity in the interpretation of the terms of that consent. Normatively, the 
strength of such consent will often depend on the processes used to achieve it; 
inclusive, participatory processes with a parliamentary focus more strongly 
justify higher-level decisionmaking than merely executive ones, which still tend 
to be common in international institutions.105 
Another reason for scaling up decisions is often found in considerations of 
justice, which are supposed to be removed from the disposition of sub-units. 
Their extent may be relatively clear when it comes to direct violations of the 
harm principle through physical transboundary effects, such as violence or 
environmental harm. Mattias Kumm’s article in this symposium elaborates 
further and shows how “justice-sensitive externalities” challenge claims of states 
to be bound only with their specific consent.106 Less clarity reigns when it comes 
to indirect harm, which may occur, for example, through the establishment of 
an economic structure with benefits for some and severe costs for others.107 And 
yet less agreement exists on questions of global distributive justice—
transboundary solidarity obligations, often seen as part of a cosmopolitan 
framework.108 Specifying obligations in such controversial cases requires a 
political process,109 but one that cannot take place solely on the national or the 
global level. 
C. Different Areas 
As becomes apparent from the considerations above, the arguments for 
subsidiarity vary significantly across issue areas. In some areas they point to 
lower-level, and in other areas to higher-level, decisionmaking. It thus appears 
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sensible to operate with different specifications of subsidiarity—different 
default rules—for different issue areas, depending on what kind of prima facie 
case can be made. As always, the general rule may be rebutted in particular 
circumstances, but subsidiarity can prove its utility by providing an issue-
specific argumentation frame that shifts the burden of argument. 
If the general default rule is strong subsidiarity, there are still areas that 
warrant global decisions. This is the case when clear arguments from justice 
require going beyond national decisions, as in international security or global 
environmental affairs, insofar as they deal with direct harm inflicted across 
boundaries. In such areas, one may want to apply a weak version of subsidiarity, 
with a low threshold for justifying decisionmaking in a particular case. Yet this 
alleviation of the standard should cover only the core of these areas—policies 
directly related to transboundary harm—and not adjacent or ancillary 
questions. 
On the other hand, there are areas in which reasons for upscaling 
decisionmaking are not generally apparent. These concern issues of only local 
or national concern, or those that affect outsiders in insignificant ways, as in 
trade or investment where, as Kumm points out, there is little reason to 
override domestic choices.110 Unless one subscribed to a merely economic case 
for subsidiarity, upscaling decisionmaking on such matters has to be based 
primarily on consent and delegation. In interpreting the terms of that consent, a 
strong subsidiarity principle counsels deference—a point made forcefully in the 
contributions by Feichtner on the political and by Howse and Nicolaïdis on the 
quasi-judicial bodies of the WTO.111 In cases of interpretive doubt, domestic 
policies should be granted respect, and trade internationalization should not be 
regarded as requiring a harmonization of regulatory standards in loosely related 
fields. 
Between these issue areas, distinctions are often not watertight—many 
questions straddle boundaries. And there are areas in which prima facie 
considerations turn out to be ambiguous. This is especially the case for human 
rights (and similarly for international criminal justice). Human rights are not 
transboundary but instead benefit individuals and minorities within a given sub-
unit; as a matter of morality, however, they are not at the disposal of (national 
or international) politics. As with other questions of justice, the definition of 
their scope and content (beyond a narrow, undisputed core) requires an active 
process of lawmaking.112 
Yet as Føllesdal argues with a view to the European human rights regime, 
especially for rights issues that are likely to be affected by biases in the national 
political process—the rights of disadvantaged individuals and groups—this 
process can hardly be left to the domestic level alone.113 This point is also at the 
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core of Zumbansen’s contribution, which highlights the dark side of 
subsidiarity—its role in denying protection to vulnerable groups within the sub-
units.114 Zumbansen focuses on labor rights, which, in the global economy, are 
often left to markets to regulate and police in the absence of strong institutions 
at the international level (and given the weakness of many countries’ domestic 
institutions vis-à-vis economic actors). The normative limits of applying 
subsidiarity in areas strongly affected by considerations of rights and justice 
become exceedingly clear in this context. 
Overall, there are good normative reasons for a strong version of 
subsidiarity as a general principle in global governance, but there is also 
significant variation across issue areas, suggesting a relaxation of the standard 
for areas with strong elements of transboundary justice. Moreover, subsidiarity 
will often apply within a frame defined by consent and delegation, and thus its 
scope and bounds will depend heavily on the terms of that frame. Subsidiarity 
in global governance is therefore bound to be a highly variegated affair. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Subsidiarity is leaving traces in many fields of global governance. Long 
present in different forms in federal systems and the EU, it is now increasingly 
invoked in global contexts in order to provide principled guidance for the 
allocation of powers between different layers of governance. With this framing 
article—and the symposium as a whole—we aim to reconstruct existing trends 
and discourses and to identify the place and role subsidiarity has (and should 
have) in global governance. 
As a rebuttable presumption for the local, subsidiarity can be applied “in 
any polity in which governmental authority is lodged at different vertical 
levels.”115 It provides an argumentation framework, or a default rule, for 
regulating the allocation and exercise of powers among the different levels. 
Its most typical application concerns the exercise of autonomous 
institutional powers: We can expect the demand for an inclusion of subsidiarity 
as a guiding principle to grow with the strength, visibility, and specificity of 
authority in global governance, and especially with the expansion of authority 
over time beyond initial (often consensually adopted) frames. The supply of 
subsidiarity, however, is likely to be uneven: although autonomous global 
governance institutions may have incentives to respond to subsidiarity demands 
in order to bolster their position and legitimacy, the inclusion or application of 
subsidiarity as a decisional principle may be prevented by powerful actors with 
stakes in the strength of the regime. Subsidiarity demands in global governance 
have translated into practice in certain areas of international politics—for 
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example, the European human rights regime—while they have found less 
expression in other areas, such as trade and investment. In contrast, more fluid 
and informal institutional settings typically trigger fewer demands for 
subsidiarity, and they are also not as well suited to the application of the 
principle as more formal decisional processes. 
The extent and direction of subsidiarity in practice contrast significantly 
with the normative case for subsidiarity we develop. We argue that strong 
subsidiarity, based on considerations of self-government and value pluralism, 
should be seen as a general default rule across issue areas, and that it should 
apply especially firmly in areas in which weighty, justice-based reasons for 
upscaling decisionmaking are not easily identifiable. These reasons include, first 
and foremost, economic domains such as trade and investment, where one 
would expect political and judicial bodies to practice significant deference to 
domestic decisionmaking. In other areas, such as international security or 
environmental regulation, which deal with issues of direct transboundary 
impact, we advocate for a weak version of subsidiarity—one that retains a 
general presumption for the local, but lowers the threshold for upscaling 
decisionmaking. As for human rights, our assessment is more ambivalent 
because the scope and extent of rights ought to be defined with input from 
national and international levels, so as to counter potential biases against 
vulnerable groups in the national political process. 
Subsidiarity is not a cure-all for the ills of global governance, but it is 
beginning to shape different areas and institutional contexts, and it holds 
significant promise as normative and legal guidance for institutional design and 
for the exercise of authority in the global realm. The landscape of subsidiarity is 
bound to remain variegated, but the concept is gaining ground and for many 
actors holds much appeal as a principled way of balancing the need for strong 
global cooperation with a continuing emphasis on the value of local self-
government. 
 
